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We show that the Minority Game, a model of interacting heterogeneous agents, can be described
as a spin systems and it displays a phase transition between a symmetric phase and a symmetry
broken phase where the games outcome is predicable. As a result a “spontaneous magnetization”
arises in the spin formalism.
Market interactions among economic agents give rise
to fluctuation phenomena which are raising much interest
in statistical physics [1,2]. The search for a toy system
to study agents with market-like interactions has led to
the definition of the Minority Game [2,3] (MG), a model
inspired by Arthur’s “El Farrol” problem [4], which em-
bodies some basic market mechanisms [2] while keeping
the mathematical complexity to a minimum.
In short, the MG is a repeated game where N agents
have to decide which of two actions (such as buy or sell)
to make. With N odd, this procedure identifies a minor-
ity action as that choosen by the minority. Agents who
took the minority action are rewarded by one payoff unit,
whereas the majority of agents looses one unit. Agents
do not communicate one with the other and they have
access to a “public information” – related to past game
outcomes – represented by one of P possible patterns.
The strategic point of view of game theory may require,
in a case like this, a prohibitive computational task for
each of the agents [5]. That is specially true if N and P
are very large and agents have not complete information
on the detailed mechanism which determines their pay-
offs, the identity of their opponents or even their number
N . In such complex strategic situations – which are sim-
ilar to those that agents face in stock markets [2,6] –
agents may prefer to simplify their decision task by look-
ing for simple behavioral rules which prescribe an action
for each of the P possible patterns. This may be partic-
ularly advantageous if computational costs exist.
This behavior, called inductive reasoning in ref. [4], is
the basis of the MG [2,3]: each agent has a pool of S rules
which prescribe an action for each of the P patterns. At
each time, she follows her best rule (see below for a more
precise definition). These rules, called strategies below,
are initially drawn at random among all possible rules,
independently for each agent in order to model agents’
heterogeneity of beliefs and behaviors.
Numerical simulations [3,7,8] have shown that this sys-
tem displays a cooperative phase for large values of the
ratio α = P/N : With respect to the simple “random
agent” state – where each agent just tosses a coin to
choose her action – agents are better off because they
get to enstablish a sort of coordination. For small values
of α agents receive, on average, poorer payoffs than in
the random agent state, a behavior which has been re-
lated to crowd effects in markets [2,7,8]. A qualitative
understanding of this behavior has been given in terms
of geometric considerations [2,9].
In this Letter we show that the model can be described
as a spin system and, as α = P/N varies, it undergoes
a dynamical phase transition with symmetry breaking.
The symmetry which gets broken is the equivalence be-
tween the two actions: in the symmetric phase (α < αc)
both actions are taken by the minority with the same
frequency (e.g. there are, on average, as many buyers as
sellers). For α > αc, in each of the P possible states, the
minority does more frequently an action than the other
one, i.e. the game’s outcome is asymmetric. An asym-
metry in the game’s outcome is an opportunity that an
agent could in principle exploit to gain. This is called
an arbitrage in economics and it bears a particularly rel-
evant meaning (see discussions in [2,7]). The asymmetry
for α > αc naturally suggests an order parameter and
is related to a “phase separation” in the population of
agents: while for α < αc all agents use all of their strate-
gies, for α > αc a finite fraction φ of the agents ends up
using only one strategy which, in the spin formalism, is
the analog of spontaneous magnetization. The point αc
also marks the transition from persistence (for α > αc)
to anti-persistence (α < αc) of the game’s time series.
Let us start from a sharp definition of the model:
We use + and − to denote the two possible actions,
so that a generic action is a sign. At each time t,
the information available to each agent is the string
µt = (χt−1, . . . , χt−M ) of the lastM actions taken by the
minority. This, in our notation is a string of M minority
signs χt−k ∈ {±1}. There are P = 2
M possible such
strings, which we shall label, by an index µ = 1, . . . , P
[10]. The index µt corresponding to (χt−1, . . . , χt−M )
shall be called the present history, for short. For each
history µ, a strategy a specifies a fixed action aµ . Each
agent i = 1, . . . , N has S = 2 strategies, denoted by a±,i,
which are randomly drawn from the set of all 2P possible
strategies (the generalization to S > 2 strategies will be
discussed below). We define
1
ωµi =
aµ+,i + a
µ
−,i
2
, ξµi =
aµ+,i − a
µ
−,i
2
so that the strategies of agent i can be written as aµsi,i =
ωµi + siξ
µ
i with si = ±1. If ω
µ
i 6= 0, then ξ
µ
i = 0
(and viceversa) and the player always takes the decision
ωµi whenever the history is µ. The current best strat-
egy of agent i, which she shall adopt at time t, is that
which has the highest cumulated payoff. Let us define
∆i,t ≡ U
(+)
i,t − U
(−)
i,t as the difference between the cumu-
lated payoffs U
(±)
i,t of strategies + and − for agent i at
time t. Therefore her choice is given by
si = sign∆i,t (1)
where ties (∆i,t = 0) are broken by coin tossing. The
difference in the population of agents choosing the + and
the − sign, at time t, is then
At =
N∑
i=1
aµtsi,i = Ω
µt +
N∑
i=1
ξµti si (2)
where Ωµ =
∑
i ω
µ
i . The sign chosen by the minority
gives the minority sign at time t
χt = −signAt (3)
and this determines the new history µt+1 which corre-
sponds to the string (χt, . . . , χt−M+1) [10]. Finally, each
agent i rewards those of her strategies which have pre-
dicted the right sign (aµts,i = χt) updating the cumulated
payoffs U
(±)
i,t+1 = U
(±)
i,t + a
µt
±,iχt. This implies that the
cumulated payoff difference ∆i,t is updated according to
∆i,t+1 = ∆i,t + 2χtξ
µt
i . (4)
Eqs. (1–4) update the state {µt,∆i,t} of the system
from t to t + 1. With an initial condition (e.g. µ0 =
1, ∆i,0 = 0, ∀i) the dynamics of the MG is completely
specified. The “quenched” variables {Ωµ, ξµi } play here
the same role as disorder in statistical mechanics [11].
An important quantity in the MG is the variance σ2 =
〈A2〉 of the difference A in the sizes of the two popula-
tions, where 〈·〉 is a time average in the stationary state of
the process specified by Eqs. (1–4). The number of win-
ners, at each time step, is (N−|A|)/2 ≈ (N−σ)/2 so that
smaller fluctuations σ2 correspond to larger global gain.
A population of random agents would yield σ2 = N . Nu-
merical simulations [3,7,8] (see Fig. 1) show that, for
α = P/N large enough, agents with inductive reasoning
manage to behave globally better (i.e. σ2 < N) than
random agents whereas σ2 > N for small α (see Fig.
1). However no singularity (and no order parameter) has
been yet identified in order to locate a phase transition.
As shown in ref. [12], to a good approximation one can
neglect the coupling of the dynamics of ∆i,t and µt and
replace the dynamics of the latter by random sampling
of the history space, i.e. Prob(µt = µ) = 1/P , ∀µ. This
simplifies considerably our discussion since then
σ2 ≃
1
P
P∑
µ=1
(Ωµ)
2
+ 2
N∑
i=1
hi〈si〉+
N∑
i,j=1
Ji,j〈sisj〉, (5)
where 〈·〉 stands for a time average and
hi =
1
P
P∑
µ=1
Ωµξµi , Ji,j =
1
P
P∑
µ=1
ξµi ξ
µ
j . (6)
The field hi measures the difference of correlation of the
two strategies with Ωµ whereas the coupling Ji,j accounts
for the interaction between agents as well as for agents
self-interaction (Ji,i). The structure of the couplings (6)
is reminiscent of neural networks models [11] where ξµi
play the role of memory patterns. This similarity con-
firms the conclusion of refs. [2,7,9] that the relevant pa-
rameter is the ratio α = P/N between the number of
patterns and the number of spins.
The key element which is at the origin of the behavior
of the model is the fact that for each history µ, there are
agents which always take the same decision. This gives
rise to the time independent contribution Ωµ in A which
produces a bias in the value of χt whenever µt = µ. A
measure of this bias, is given by the parameter
θ =
√√√√ 1
P
P∑
µ=1
〈χ|µ〉2 (7)
where 〈χ|µ〉 is the conditional average of χt given that
µt = µ. Loosely speaking, θ measures the presence of
information or arbitrages in the signal χt. If θ > 0 an
agent with strategies of “length” M = log2 P , can detect
and exploit this information if one of her’s strategies is
more correlated with 〈χ|µ〉 than the other. More pre-
cisely, we observe that if vi ≡ 〈∆i,t+1 −∆i,t〉 6= 0 then
∆i,t ≃ vit grows linearly with time, and the agent’s spin
will always take the value si = sign vi. We shall call this
a frozen agent, since her spin variable is frozen. We find
vi = 〈χtξ
µt
i 〉 ≃
1
P
P∑
µ=1
〈χ|µ〉ξµi ∝ −hi −
N∑
j=1
Ji,j〈sj〉 (8)
where the last equation relies on an expansion of 〈χ|µ〉
to linear order in A [13].
It is instructive to consider first the case where other
agents choose by coin tossing (i.e. 〈sj〉 = 0 for j 6= i) so
that vi ∝ −hi − Ji,i〈si〉. If vi 6= 0 then si = sign vi =
−sign (hi+Ji,i〈si〉). But this last equation has a solution
only if |hi| > Ji,i whereas otherwise |〈si〉| < 1 and vi = 0.
Note that Ji,i ≃ 1/2 and that hi can be approximated
by a gaussian variable with zero average and variance
(4α)−1. This means that |hi| ≪ Ji,i for α ≫ 1, which
implies that most agents have 〈si〉 ≈ 0 in this limit and
2
we can indeed neglect agent–agent interaction. This al-
lows to compute the probability for an agent to be frozen
φ = P{|hi| > Ji,i} ∝ e
−α/2, (9)
for α ≫ 1. Numerical simulations show that φ ∝
e−(0.37±0.02)α indeed decays exponentially. As α → ∞,
the random agents limit is attained because 〈si〉 → 0 for
all i and 〈sisj〉 = 〈si〉〈sj〉 for i 6= j. By Eq. (5) we find
σ2 =
∑
µ(Ω
µ)2/P +
∑
i Ji,i ≃ N .
The same argument applies in general, with the dif-
ference that the “bare” field hi must be replaced by the
“effective” field h˜i = hi +
∑
j 6=i Ji,j〈sj〉. In order for
agent i to get frozen, her effective field h˜i must ovecome
the self interaction Ji,i, i.e. |h˜i| > Ji,i ≃ 1/2. If this con-
dition is met, si = −sign h˜i. It can also be shown that a
frozen agent will, on average, receive a larger payoff than
an unfrozen agent [14]. Loosely speaking, one can say
that a frozen agent has a good and a bad strategy and
the good one remains better than the bad one even when
she actually uses it. On the contrary, unfrozen agents
have two strategies each of which seems better than the
other when it is not adopted. In this sense, symmetry
breaking in 〈χ|µ〉 induced a sort of breakdown in the a
priori equivalence of agents’ strategies.
A quantitative analysis of the fully interacting system
shall be presented elsewhere [14]. For the time being we
shall discuss the behavior of the system on the basis of
extensive numerical simulations. Fig. 1 reports the be-
havior of θ, φ and σ2 as functions of α for several values
of P . As α decreases, i.e. as more and more agents join
the game, the arbitrages opportunities, as measured by
θ decrease. In loose words, agents’ exploitation of the
signal Ωµ weakens its strength by screening it with their
adaptive behavior. If the number N of agents is small
compared to the signal “complexity” P = 2M , agents
exploit only partially the signal Ωµ whereas if N ≫ P
then Ωµ is completely screened by agents’ behavior and
θ = 0. As Figure 1 shows, the parameter θ displays the
characteristic behavior of an order parameter with a sin-
gularity at αc ≈ 0.34. Accordingly also the fraction φ of
frozen agents drops to zero as α→ α+c . The comparison
between different system sizes in Fig. 1 strongly suggests
that φ drops discontinuously to zero at αc (and it also
gives the value of αc). The vanishing of φ is clearly a
consequence of the fact that θ also vanishes at αc. In-
deed if 〈χ|µ〉 = 0 for all µ, by Eq. (8), also vi = 0 for all
i, so that ∆i,t remains bounded and |〈si〉| < 1.
The transition can also be understood in terms of the
variables ∆i,t as an “unbinding” transition as α → α
−
c :
For α < αc a “bound state” exists with finite ∆i,t,
which corresponds to the fact that the equations vi = 0,
i = 1, . . . , N admit a solution with |〈si〉| < 1, ∀i [14]
(only P of the equations vi = 0 are linearly indepen-
dent). For α > αc this is no longer true and the popu-
lation separates: a fraction φ of variables ∆i,t acquire a
constant “velocity” vi 6= 0 (with |〈si〉| = 1) whereas for
the remaining agents vi = 0, ∆i,t remains bounded and
|〈si〉| < 1.
It is suggestive to observe that vi ∝ −
∂σ2
∂si
so that the
dynamics of the minority game is actually similar to a
spin dynamics with hamiltonian σ2. Indeed either the
spin is frozen in the direction which minimizes −sivi(si),
or its average 〈si〉 is such that vi = 0. This then explains
why cooperation occurs in the MG. A closer analysis,
to be reported elsewhere [14], reveals that indeed the
stationary state of the MG is described by the ground
state properties of an Hamiltonian very similar to σ2.
Finite size scaling suggests that σ2 has a minimum at αc
with a discontinuity in its derivative (see Fig. 1). These
conclusions are indeed confirmed by exact results [14]. It
is worth to stress, however, that the qualitative aspects
of the transition are already captured at the simple level
of approximation of Eq. (8).
Let us go back to Fig. 1. Above αc agents do not fully
exploit the information Ωµ and, as a result, 〈χ|µ〉 6= 0.
Figure 2 shows that χt shows persistence in time, in the
sense that when µt = µt+τ the minority signs χt and
χt+τ tend to be the same. This persistence disappears,
〈χtχt+τ |µt = µt+τ 〉 → 0 as α decreases and it turns into
anti-persistence for smaller α. The oscillatory behavior in
Fig. 2 has indeed period 2P which means that typically
when the population comes again on the same history µ
it tends to do the opposite of what it did the time be-
fore. Even if finite size effects do not allow a definite
conclusion, it is quite likely that this change in time cor-
relations also occurs at αc [14]. Time correlations, even
though of opposite nature, are present both above and
below αc. These are like arbitrages in a market which
could be exploited by agents. In this sense the market is
efficient, i.e. arbitrage free, only for α = αc.
The same qualitative behavior is expected when agents
have S > 2 strategies. Again for a given history µ it may
happen that all the S agent’s i strategies prescribe the
same action: agent i will do that action no matter what
strategy she has choosen. As S increases, this will occur
for a smaller and smaller number of histories (more pre-
cisely with a probability 21−S). This shall correspond to
a weaker signal Ωµ which is in complete agreement with
the observation [7,9] of shallower features for larger S.
Note that, for each agent it would be rewarding to in-
crease the number of strategies because they would have
more chances to outguess χt. At the same time, if all
agents increase S the game becomes less rewarding for
all of them, at least for α > αc. This situation is typical
of games, such as the tragedy of commons, where many
agents interact through a global resource [15].
The condition vi = 0 for the bound state in the sym-
metric phase involves P equations with (S − 1)N vari-
ables. This suggests that in general the scaling parame-
ter is α = P/[(S − 1)N ]. The curve σ2/N as a function
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of α = P/[(S − 1)N ] collapse remarkably well one on
the other for α ≤ αc (especially for S > 2) but not for
α > αc (e.g. in the large α behavior φ ∝ e
−C(S)α we
found C(2) ≈ 0.37, C(3) ≈ 1.50 and C(4) ≈ 2.90).
Our approach also implies that no coordination is pos-
sible if agents have S = 2 opposite strategies (aµ+,i =
−aµ−,i) because then Ω
µ = 0. Numerical simulations
show that indeed σ2 ≥ N for all α > 0 in this case.
The same qualitative behavior also occurs in a wide
range of related models. First, total freezing occurs in
majority models. Note indeed that changing the sign
of Eq. (3) would also change the sign in Eq. (8). In
particular the self-interaction Ji,i changes sign so that
it becomes favorable for each agent to stick to only one
strategy anyway. The model is therefore trivial. More in-
teresting models are obtained keeping the “frustration”
effects of the MG but changing the definition of payoffs
in Eq. (4). It can be shown [14] that the phase transi-
tion and the large α behavior are quite robust features
of minority games (see e.g. [13]).
In summary we find that a phase transition occurs in
the minority game. The cooperative phase (α > αc) is
characterized by the presence of a fraction φ of frozen
agents (who use only one strategy), unexploited arbi-
trages (〈χ|µ〉 6= 0) and persistence in the global signal
χt. In the symmetric phase (α < αc) inductive dynamics
is inefficient: agents adopt strategies when they are no
more good. There is no arbitrage (for strategies of length
M) to exploit and the signal shows anti-persistence.
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FIG. 1. Top: σ2/N versus α = P/N for P = 2M with
M = 5, 6 and 7. Bottom: θ2 and φ versus α for the same
system sizes P . The vertical dashed line is at α = 0.34 ≈ αc.
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FIG. 2. Temporal correlation of χt on the same history,
〈χtχt+τ |µt = µt+τ 〉, averaged over all histories versus τ (10
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